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THE ECLIPSE OF REASON: A RHETORICAL READING
OF BOWERS v HARDWICK
Kendall Thomas*
[P]assion never fails to wrest the scepterfrom reason.

-Pubius (James Madison)1
N a careful and compelling reading of the text of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 Janet Halley provides a
meticulous map of the misprisions by which the Hardwick Court
"exploit[s] confusion about what sodomy is in ways that create opportunities for the [judicial] exercise of homophobic power."' According
to Professor Halley, the duplicitous mechanisms the Hardwick Court
marshals in reasoning about sodomy entail a mobilization of two
"incommensurable articulations": the idea of the sodomitical act, on
the one hand, and that of personal identity, on the other.4
Professor Halley rightly insists that an anti-homophobic critique of
Hardwick should refuse to confine itself to "questions whether the
Court's analysis is more fundamentally act-based or identity-based,
and whether it can be better refuted from an act- or identity-based
position." 5 Because both paths ultimately lead to the same conceptual cul-de-sac, Professor Halley urges us to focus instead on the
dually duplicitous stratagem by which the Hardwick Court simultaneously deploys act- and identity-based theories of sodomy.
I concur in Professor Halley's judgment that critical examination of
the act-based and identity-based theories of sodomy ought not be
* © Kendall Thomas, 1993. Professor, Columbia Law School. A shorter version of this

Commentary appears in 1 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies (1993). This work is
dedicated to the memory of Willie L. Moore and Anthony Thomas.
I The Federalist No. 55 (James Madison). The Madisonian maxim appears in a passage of
the Federalist defending constitutional controls on the size of the proposed House of

Representatives. In using it here, I do not mean to suggest that Madison foresaw or could
have foreseen that the possibility that the mob mentality against which he sought to guard
could arise in smaller, arguably unrepresentative bodies such as the Supreme Court.
2 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3 Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1721, 1770 (1993).
4 Id. at 1726.
5 Id. at 1770.
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viewed as mutually exclusive. After Hardwick, how could they be? It
would be intellectually and ideologically unwise not to engage the
"binocular vision ' 6 that informs the Hardwick opinion-in all its
simultaneity. Indeed, we must be prepared to press the project proposed by Professor Halley even further. An analysis of the ways in
which the Hardwick decision uses act-based and identity-based conceptions of sodomy is important, but standing alone, it does not
exhaust the complex meanings inscribed in the Court's double deployment. The complexities increase when the investigation of act-based
and identity-based conceptions of sodomy remains inattentive to the
possibility that the opposition drawn between sexual acts and sexual
identities may be more apparent than real. 7 The relational dependence between act and identity to which Professor Halley calls our
attention suggests that our collective project will remain unfinished
without an analysis that transposes the anti-homophobic critique of
Hardwick into another, even more dissonant key. If the exploration
of the act-based versus identity-based conceptions of sodomy was the
first step in the anti-homophobic critique of Hardwick, and the binocular investigation undertaken by Professor Halley the second, the
third step in our critical response to the homophobic ideology
embraced by the Hardwick Court should be a sustained challenge to
the very terms of the opposition between sexual acts and sexual identities. This is the task I undertake here.
The most promising target for a deconstruction of the metaphysical
infrastructure that subtends both the distinction between sexual acts
and sexual identities, and a more nuanced understanding which sees
the two as relational and dependent, is neither the act of "homosexual
sodomy," nor "homosexual" identity. Instead, we must begin to take
rigorous and relentless critical aim at the ideology and institution of
normative heterosexuality. I do so in a slightly perverse, but, I hope,
productive way.
I have suggested in some of my work in critical race theory that
"race" is a verb, that we are "raced" through a constellation of prac6 Id. at 1746.
7 Professor Halley argues that the act-based approach to sodomy that governs the Court's
analysis in Hardwick "both distinguishes itself from and depends upon an identity-based

approach." Id. at 1768. Nonetheless, this statement is in tension with Halley's assertion that
the

"sodomitical

act"

and

articulations." Id. at 1726.

the idea

of "personal

identity"

are "incommensurable
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tices that construct and control racial subjectivities.8 Much the same
may be said of sexual identity. Sexual identity does not exist apart
from the active practices by which it is ascribed, asserted, avowed,
and indeed, disavowed. Similarly, the very idea of a human sexual act
necessarily presupposes the existence of an identifiable agent or actor
who can engage in or "have" (as we Americans say) sex, even where
the actor or agent is not understood as a "personage," a "life form,"
or a "species" in the Foucauldian sense. 9
We need, therefore, a conceptual vocabulary that tracks the
performative act of identification. Heterosexual identity is "performative," in the sense that the content of heterosexual identity has to be
produced, fabricated, made up, and acted out. Recall, in this connection, the etymological roots of the word "orientation": heterosexual
identity has to be "oriented" or raised up alongside, and against, its
identificatory alternatives. Like all sexualities, heterosexuality has no
ontological status apart from the various acts of identification whose
performance constitutes its "reality."
A close textual reading of a passage in the Hardwick opinion
reveals the performative nature of heterosexual identity as staged by
the Supreme Court. The starting point for this analysis, however, is
Freud's celebrated reading of a text whose author has been described
as "by far the most famous mental patient ever."10 The text in question is Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, written by Dr. jur. Daniel Paul
Schreber, a German lawyer, judge, and Senatspriisident of the Dresden Appeal Court." As anyone who has read his Psycho-Analytic
Notes on an AutobiographicalAccount of a Case of Paranoia(Dementia Paranoides)1 will recall, Freud uses the Schreber Memoirs to
develop a theory of the catalytic role played by repressed homosexual
8 See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Comments at Frontiers of Legal Thought Conference, Duke
Law School (Jan. 26, 1990), quoted in Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in Man J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard
Delgado & Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, Words That Wound 53, 61 (1993).
9 See I Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 43 (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon
Books 1978) (1976).
10Psychosis and Sexual Identity: Toward a Post-Analytic View of the Schreber Case 2
(David B. Allison, Prado de Oliveira, Mark S. Roberts & Allen S. Weiss eds., 1988).
11Daniel P. Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (Ida Macalpine & Richard A.

Hunter eds. & trans., 1955).
12 Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of
Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911), reprinted in 12 Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (1911-1913), at 1 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1958).

1808

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 79:1805

wish fantasies in the mechanism of paranoid psychosis. For Freud,
the "salient feature" 13 of the Memoirs is a "delusion of emasculation"
or Judge Schreber's belief that he was "being transformed into a
woman."14 Freud explains that Schreber's psychotic fantasy is triggered one morning "between sleeping and waking" by the thought
"'that after all it really must be very nice to be a woman submitting
to the act of copulation.' "15 "This idea," writes Freud, "was one
which [Schreber] would have rejected with the greatest indignation if
he had been fully conscious." 16 Indeed, Schreber recounts in the
Memoirs that he initially construed his transformative "unmanning"
(Entmannung)17 as a conspiracy in which "'God Himself had played
the part of accomplice, if not of instigator.' "18 This divinely ordained
scheme, Schreber notes paradoxically, was driven by purposes " 'contrary to the Order of Things' ,,:19 Schreber's "'soul was to be mur-

dered' " and his transformed "'body used like a strumpet.' "20 Over
time, however, the judge decides that his "emasculation" is in fact
part of a "divine miracle," and is thus very much "'in consonance
with the Order of Things.' "21 Schreber is forced to realize that" 'the

Order of Things imperatively demanded [his] emasculation, whether
[he] personally liked it or no,' "22 because he had been chosen for
"'[s]omething... similar to the conception of Jesus Christ by the
Immaculate Virgin.' "23 The judge comes to interpret his "unmanning" as a sign that God has called him to redeem the world: "'The
further consequence of my emasculation could, of course, only be my
impregnation by divine rays to the end that a new race of men might
be created.' "24 Sehreber is eventually able to "'reconcile [himself] to
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 13.
16 Id.
17This is the term used by Macalpine and Hunter in their English translation of the
Schreber Memoirs, who note that the primary meaning of the German "Entmannung" is "'to
remove from the category of men,' which is what Schreber intended." Schreber, supra note 11,
at 361.
1 Freud, supra note 12, at 19.
13
14
15

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22

23
24

at 20.
Id.
Id. at 32 n.1.
Id. at 20-21.
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the thought of being transformed into a woman'" and reports in lavish detail the hours he spends before the mirror "'with the upper
portion of [his] body bared, and wearing sundry feminine adornments,
such as ribbons, false necklaces, and the like.' "25 Having transposed
his dissonant sexual fantasy into a more harmonious spiritual key,
Schreber finally accepts his calling. Schreber confesses that he finds
that "'a little sensual pleasure falls to [his] share' "26 when he
"inscribe[s] upon [his] banner the cultivation of femaleness' "27 and
evokes that "'sensation of voluptuousness such as women experience,' 928 without which he cannot discharge his new maternal duty
to keep God in a "'constant state of enjoyment.' "29 It is thus that
the "'unequal struggle between this one weak man and God himself' "30 is brought to a happy end. In Freud's formulation, what
begins as a "sexual delusion of persecution" is "converted in
[Schreber's] mind into a religious delusion of grandeur."3
The present analysis explores the uncanny continuities between the
psychotic discourse of Judge Schreber's Memoirs and the bizarre figural logic that informs a more recent, but no less troubling, judicial
text: I refer here, again, to the 1986 opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick,32 a legal decision whose aftershocks continue to register in our national political discourse about
sexual identity and difference.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

21.
34.
33.
32.
34.
19.
18.

Freud's reading of the Memoirs of a Nervous Illness has suffered a curious fate. Although
the project of the Psycho-Analytic Notes clearly was to demonstrate the psychopathological
effects that the repression of homosexual desire produced in a socially heterosexual man,
Freud's study was quickly put to very different use. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has noted,
later interpretations of the Psycho-Analytic Notes deployed Freud's psychoanalysis of the
Schreber Memoirs "not against homophobia and its schizogenic [sic] force, but against
homosexuality" and homosexuals. Eve K. Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and
Male Homosocial Desire 20 (1985). This interpretive parapraxis led to a strange state of affairs
in which the homosexual, rather than the homophobe, became the subject of mental illness.
Needless to say, these misreadings of the Psycho-Analytic Notes have blurred the focus and

blunted the force of Freud's potentially subversive insights about the violent psychic pressures
compulsory heterosexuality exerts on homosexual desire in those who consider themselves to
be heterosexual.
32 478 U.S. 186.
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Hardwick presented a challenge to the constitutionality of a Georgia criminal statute prohibiting "sodomy. ' 33 The "anti-sodomy" law
covered a broad range of private sexual practices between consenting
adults, including, but not limited to, those involving individuals of the
same sex. 34 Michael Hardwick, the Georgia citizen who challenged
the statute, sought a broad judgment from the Supreme Court regarding the "facial" constitutionality of the law: Hardwick argued that the
federal Constitution precluded the Georgia legislature from punishing
any private consensual instance of the sexual activities interdicted by
its "anti-sodomy" statute, regardless of the marital status or sex of
those who violated it.35 The Supreme Court, however, resolutely
avoided judgment on that broad issue. Instead, the Hardwick Court
took the view that the only question properly before it was the constitutionality of the Georgia law as applied to private sexual practices
between consenting adults of the same sex, acts which the Court
denominated "homosexual sodomy."'36 Having thus narrowed the
scope of its inquiry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's "anti-sodomy" law, at least as it had been applied to Michael
Hardwick. 7 In an opinion by Justice Byron R. White, the closely
divided Court concluded that the Federal Constitution does not "confer[ ] a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy,"
and that the Court therefore could not justify judicial invalidation of
"make such conduct illegal
"the sodomy laws of some 25 States" that
' 'a
and have done so for a very long time. 3
The decision in Hardwick has given rise to a considerable body of
critical commentary in legal circles. Most of these discussions debate
the question whether the Court's refusal to declare the Georgia stat33 Id. at 187-88.
34 Id. at 188 n.1; see Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984).
35 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, then

Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist questioned the description of Hardwick's claim as a
"facial" challenge to the Georgia statute. Justice Rehnquist insisted that a "facial"
constitutional attack on the "anti-sodomy" law would draw no distinction between public and
private commission of the prohibited acts. Hardwick's counsel placed great emphasis on the
fact that the practices for which Hardwick was arrested took place in the privacy of his home.
Oral Argument in Bowers v. Hardwick, in Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme

Court of the United States: Constitutional Law: 1985 Term Supplement 650-51 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1987).

36Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
37 Id. at 196.
38 Id. at 190, 196.
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ute unconstitutional comports with, or contradicts, its earlier decisions regarding state regulation of private sexual conduct. 39 This
focus on the Court's refusal to extend the doctrine of constitutional
privacy has obscured another, equally important dimension of the
Hardwick opinion: its place in the broader archive of cultural texts
about the meaning of legal identity and sexual difference. Attention
to the larger social significance of the Hardwick case requires analysis
not so much of the doctrine as of the discursive strategies the Court
employed to explain the doctrinal grounds on which the decision
rested. The failure of academic lawyers to attend to the rhetorical
register of Hardwick in turn may be traced to the undertheorized and
ultimately incomplete understanding of the rhetorical forms in which
Supreme Court opinions are cast.
Until quite recently, professional students of the Supreme Court
have been conditioned to train their interpretive energies on the logic,
rather than the language, of the Court's opinions. In short, they have
viewed the rhetoric of Supreme Court analysis and argument mainly
as a tool for communicating rules of constitutional law, which are
taken to be separate and distinct from that rhetoric itself.40 Happily,
a number of legal scholars have come to reject this orthodox view of
the relation between legal discourse and legal doctrine.4 1 In its most
radical moments, this recent writing on the theory and practice of
legal interpretation undermines the idea that the content of legal doctrine is separable (even in principle) from its discursive form; concomitantly, this work challenges the longstanding belief that the main
mission of legal scholarship is to distill (in order to discuss) the "reasoning" of an opinion from its "rhetoric." Against the standard view,
proponents of the "linguistic" turn in legal scholarship have sought to
demonstrate that a judicial opinion (or for that matter, any legal text)
39 See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 Ind. L.J.

215, 221-37 (1986); Annamay T. Sheppard, Private Passion, Public Outrage: Thoughts on
Bowers v. Hardwick, 40 Rutgers L. Rev. 521, 547-58 (1988); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v.
Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 648 (1987).
40 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1022, 1023 (1978) (describing his project as an attempt to "separate rhetoric from live
constitutional doctrine and method").
41 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally (1989); Peter Goodrich, Legal
Discourse (1987); Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader (Sanford Levinson
& Steven Mailloux eds., 1988); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373
(1982); Gerald Graff, "Keep Off the Grass," "Drop Dead," and Other Indeterminacies: A

Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 405 (1982).
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is something more (and other) than its juridic propositions. In this
critical perspective, a judicial decision is a complex combination of
rules and rhetoric that cannot be understood without rigorous attention to its discursive dimensions, or what might loosely be termed its
"figural" or "metaphorical" elements. 42
These interrogations of the discursive foundations of legal doctrine
indicate that it is impossible to distinguish definitively between those
features of a judicial opinion that derive from its legal "substance,"
and those which have been thought to be "merely" elements of its
contingent linguistic "style." If the judicial decision is simultaneously
a configuration of doctrine and discourse, our understanding of any
particular legal judgment will remain incomplete unless we are willing
to suspend the traditional legal distinctions between idea and expression, between reasoning and rhetoric, between substance and style.
Sustained engagement with the "language" of law as such alerts us to
those aspects of the judicial decision that make possible the rhetorical
power of law but elude the rationalist interpretive protocols of doctrinal analysis, or more dangerously, unsettle them altogether. In the
terms of Jean-Frangois Lyotard, we must be prepared to exploit the
theoretical advantages that flow from sustained investigation of the
incommensurability, even antagonism, between the putatively rational
"discourse" of constitutional interpretation, on the one hand, and the
pre-rational rhetorical "figures" that visibly undermine the former.43
Indeed, in seeking to overcome the conceptual and political limits
imposed by rationalist doctrinal analysis, the rhetorical reading of the
Court's decision in Hardwick offered here will most emphatically not
approach that text "as ifit were free ofpsychic and sexualprocesses, as
ifit operatedoutside the range of their effects."' I propose, in short,
to undertake something like a psychoanalysis of juridical discourse.
I emphasize the need to attend to the figural or metaphorical
dimensions of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Hardwick case and
suggest that the approach to Hardwick urged here transgresses the
rationalist limits of conventional legal method.45 Only a rhetorical
42

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 41.

43 Jean-Frangois Lyotard, Discours, Figure (1971).
44 Jacqueline Rose, Margaret Thatcher & Ruth Ellis, 6 New Formations 3 (1988).
45 Anyone familiar with contemporary textual theory will find these observations
elementary, indeed, axiomatic. In the legal academy, some have viewed acceptance of these
ideas as a scandal, if not an act of outright treason.
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reading, which goes behind Justice White's doctrinal defense of the
result in Hardwick to examine the discursive strategies that underwrite that defense, can reveal the "unconscious" of the text. This discussion will focus on those passages in the Hardwick decision that
most clearly demonstrate the psychic mechanisms of identification
around which the Court's interpretation and adjudication of the law
of "homosexual sodomy" revolves. As used here, the term "identification" may be understood in something like its standard psychoanalytic sense, to refer to the "[p]sychological process whereby the
subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the other and is
transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the other provides.
It is by means of a series of identifications that the personality is constituted and specified." 6 The concept includes the defense mechanism known in psychoanalysis as "identification with the aggressor,"
the transformative process whereby a subject incorporates aspects of a
feared aggression in a "reversal of roles" in which "the aggressed
turns the aggressor. ' 47
Taking the psychoanalytic notion of identification as a point of
reference, I show that the Hardwick decision is not primarily or
exclusively a judicial discourse about the legal regulation of "homosexuality," or more precisely, that it is only partly so. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Hardwick is more productively understood as
entailing the discursive construction and ideological consolidation of
a certain "heterosexual" identity. In upholding the right of the state
of Georgia to police and punish the act of "homosexual sodomy," the
Hardwick Court performs an act of heterosexual identification that
produces a distinctive image of heterosexual identity. As we shall see,
however, the identificatory imperative that informs the rhetoric of the
Hardwick decision is inadequate finally to its task. The text of Hardwick reveals the degree to which the corpus of heterosexual law not
only does not differ from, but crucially depends upon, the figure of the
lawless homosexual as its factive foundation."8
46 J. Laplanche & J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis 205 (Donald Nicholson-

Smith trans., 1973) (1967) (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 209.

48 Note that here, I am discussing the male varieties of "heterosexuality" and
"homosexuality," and their concomitant expressions. This is not because I believe male
heterosexuality and homosexuality are the paradigm case of either of these two forms of
sexuality; I hold no such view. I restrict my discussion to masculine models of heterosexuality
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The decisive moment in the drama of heterosexual identification
staged in the text of Hardwick occurs in a passage toward the end of
the Court's explanation of its decision. Even earlier in his majority
opinion, Justice White suggests that consideration of the issue
presented in Hardwick will require something more than conventional
constitutional analysis.4 9 This case, he opines, "also calls for some

judgment about the limits of the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate." 50 After concluding that the modem privacy
cases do not justify constitutional protection of consensual "homosexual sodomy," White dismisses as facetious the idea that the asserted
right can be brought within the Court's more capacious formulations
protecting rights "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ,,51 Justice White
then turns from the local question of the constitutionality of the challenged statute. Responding to the felt necessity to consider the larger
structural problem presented by the case, Justice White remarks
about the likely institutional consequences of a judgment in Hardwick's favor:
[We are not] inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little
or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.
That this is so was painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the
Executive and the Court in the 1930s, which resulted in the repudiation of much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive

reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country
without express constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed
on us today falls far short of overcoming this resistance.5 2
and homosexuality only because these are the models that govern the logic of the Hardwick
Court's own analysis.
49 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 194.
52 Id. at 194-95.
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This passage is key to the Court's identification and understanding
of homosexuals. It confronts us with a complex congeries of conflicting ideas and images. Conceptually speaking, the argument is a familiar one; indeed, it approaches orthodoxy.5" Justice White plainly
fears that a decision upholding the "claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this
case"54 would undermine the authority of the Court, and erode the
fragile foundations of judicial review. White's recollection of the
"face-off between the Executive and the Court in the 1930s" evokes
the memory of the humiliations the Court suffered as a result of its
"substantive due process" decisions in Lochner v. New York 55 and its
progeny. In Justice White's view, judicial invalidation of the statute
challenged in Hardwick on substantive due process grounds would
threaten the delicate balance of power between the state and federal
governments in general, and the Supreme Court in particular. Unlike
the 1930s Court, Justice White and his colleagues are not "inclined to
take [an] ... expansive view of [their] authority to discover new fun-

damental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause."5 6 To do so, in
Justice White's view, would be to render a constitutional judgment
that would represent no more than the "imposition of the Justices'
own choice of values on the States." 57
In an essay on Hardwick, Frank Michelman has suggested that this
language, and indeed, the Hardwick opinion as a whole, embodies an
"excessively detached andpassivejudicialstance toward constitutional
law."58 At one level, this characterization of Justice White's stated
constitutional stance toward the perceived majoritarian sentiment
53 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543-44 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting). Using almost the same language he would later employ in his opinion for the
Court in Hardwick, Justice White condemned the Moore Court for overturning the criminal
conviction (under a city housing ordinance) of a woman who had refused to obey an order to
remove a grandson for whom she was caring from her home. Id. (White, J., dissenting); see id.
at 505-06 (majority opinion).
54 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
55 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law
limiting the number of working hours of bakery employees in that state. Id. at 64-65. The
Lochner Court held that the New York law unconstitutionally infringed upon the "right of
free contract," id. at 64, although the Constitution, by its terms, does not expressly confer such
a right.
56 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.

57

Id. at 191.

58 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1496 (1988).
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behind the Georgia statute is certainly correct. The passive voice to
which Justice White reverts in explaining the institutional grounds for
Court's unwillingness to expand the reach of "substantive due process" to embrace Hardwick's claim indicates an exceedingly deferential attitude toward the expressed will of Georgia's democratic
majority.5 9
Despite all this, the Court's posture is neither wholly passive nor
detached. Consider the terms in which Justice White describes the
Court's institutional obligation to avoid interpretations of constitutional law which might lead to a repetition of the political crisis
spawned by Lochner. In Justice White's words, the Court's independent interest in its institutional integrity calls for "great resistance" to
6
the constitutional claim "pressed" on it in Hardwick. 0
Given the place that the story of Lochner and its decisional
descendants have come to occupy in American constitutional folklore,
the Court's resolute "resistance" is understandable. The appeal to
Lochner and its progeny does not tell the whole story, however.
Although the memory of the Lochner era may arguably account for
the Court's stated fear of the potentially catastrophic consequences
that a ruling in Hardwick's favor might hold for the institution of
judicial review, it does not explain the precise and peculiar linguistic
means by which that fear is expressed. In this regard, Justice White's
judicial style is most revealing.
The brutal forcefulness of the figural strategies Justice White
deploys to develop his argument against the claim "pressed" on the
Court by Michael Hardwick is remarkable. Two observations are
especially relevant here. The first is the striking dissonance between
the text's position of principled judicial self-restraint, and the passionately unrestrained terms in which that defense is conducted. The radical discontinuity between Justice White's prudential narrative about
the dangers of substantive due process doctrine, and the overheated
style in which that narrative and its supposed lessons are cast seems
odd-especially in an opinion which begins with a promise to confine
its analytic scope to the narrow issue at hand, namely, "whether the
59 Indeed, the grammatical "passivity" of this passage provides a textual clue that the
political problem with which the Court wrestles in Hardwick cannot be fully captured by the
conceptual vocabulary of conventional constitutional analysis. See infra text accompanying
notes 85-111.
60 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195.
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Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy."6 1 Justice White's rhetorical excesses are all the
more remarkable in light of his argument that Hardwick "calls for
some judgment about the limits of the Court's role in carrying out its
'62
constitutional mandate.
A second and equally striking feature of the passage is its curiously

apocalyptic tone. Justice White's language is an exemplary instance
of the "paranoid style" in American constitutional law.3 White
paints an ominous picture of the "vulnerable" position in which the

Court places itself: reliance on substantive due process doctrine to
find rights which cannot be directly traced to the language of the Con-

stitution would bring the Court to the brink of institutional "illegitimacy."
Justice White speaks insistently of the need for vigilant
"resistance" to claims of a constitutional right 65 that might lead the
Supreme Court to another "face-off" of the kind it found itself in as a
result of Lochner, a fight the Justices would almost certainly lose.

Hardwick's claim of right "falls far short" in its effort to overcome
the Court's prudent unwillingness to set in motion a process which
might well end in judicial invalidation of statutes against "adultery,
incest, and other sexual crimes."' 66 In short, to extend the right of
privacy to "homosexual sodomy" would be to start down a primrose
path of constitutional principle which could lead only to institutional
Id. at 190. Specifically, Justice White declared:
This case does not require a judgment on... laws against sodomy between consenting
adults in general . . . .It raises no question about the right or propriety of state
legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of
state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds.
Id. (emphasis added).
62 Id.
63 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965). In his classic essay,
Hofstadter argues that "[c]atastrophe or the fear of catastrophe is most likely to elicit the
syndrome of paranoid rhetoric." Id. at 39. Hofstadter further contends that the "central
image" of the paranoid style "is that of a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle
machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life." Id. at 29. My
use of the term "paranoid style" differs from Hofstadter's in one key respect. Although some
governmental officials have raised the specter of a "homosexual conspiracy" to destroy the
foundations of the heterosexual "way of life" I do not find enough evidence of conspiratorial
language or logic in Hardwick for an interpretation along those lines. As I demonstrate in the
text, however, it is difficult to deny the constitutional apocalypticism at the heart of this part of
the Court's opinion; in this respect, I find Hofstadter's concept very useful.
6 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
65 Id. at 195.
6 Id. at 195-96.
61
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perdition. The Court
leaves little doubt that it is "unwilling to start
'6 7
down that road."
The Hardwick decision marks the textual site of an important institutional "representation" in the sense in which Stuart Hall has elaborated that term.6 8 For all its apparent passivity, Justice White's
stylistic strategy entails an "active work of selecting and presenting, of
structuring and shaping," a productive practice of "making things
mean."69 What emerges from the figural field of the Court's opinion
in Hardwick are distinct images of heterosexuality, of homosexuality,
and of the affective ties that bind them together. The neutered, impersonal "it" Justice White uses to describe pronominally the position in
which he and his colleagues find themselves fails to mask the libidinally resonant character of the Court's rhetorical representations of
"its" institutional identity. By attending carefully to White's language in this passage, 70 we begin to see the operations and effects of
the psycho-sexual fantasy that provides the legal result in Hardwick
with its social ground.
The rhetorical register of Justice White's argument can be taken as
a sign that the claimed right in Hardwick (and by extension, the individual in whose name that right has been asserted) provokes fear in
the Supreme Court that goes far beyond the perceived threat to its
judicial authority. The "paranoid style" of Hardwick is symptomatic
of a deeper and different anxiety. For the writer of this opinion, a
decision in Hardwick's favor would somehow not only undermine the
authority of the Court, but unman (to use Judge Schreber's word) the
patriarchal (hetero)sexual ideologies and identities on which that
authority ultimately rests. In Hardwick, the claimed right to commit
"homosexual sodomy" is thought (or not so much thought as
phantasmagorically represented) to be a threatening attack on patriarchal power.
As White's reference to the shameful "face-off" during the 1930s
between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court suggests, the
Hardwick case carries a traumatic force. It engenders a sense of panic
67 Id. at 196.

68 Stuart Hall, The Rediscovery of "Ideology": Return of the Repressed in Media Studies,
in Culture, Society and the Media 64 (Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran &
Janet Woollacott eds., photo. reprint 1990) (1982).
69 Id.
70 For the text of this passage, see supra text accompanying note 52.

1993]

Commentary

1819

among the members of the Court which can be described as the judicial equivalent of castration-anxiety. The psychic pressures this
trauma induces find displaced expression in the figural logic by which
the Hardwick Court gives voice to (homo)phobic premises that the
reigning protocols of constitutional doctrine do not permit the Court
explicitly to acknowledge, but which emerge nonetheless from the discursive grounds of the decision.
Although the opinion moves rapidly through a whole series of sexually loaded images, the chief mode by which the text of Hardwick
gives voice to a fear that dare not (literally) speak its name may be
seen in the terms of Justice White's argument regarding the "limits of
the Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate." 71 In perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Hardwick decision, the Court
positions itself in relation to Michael Hardwick and his constitutional
claim in a series of imaginary identifications whose representative
force eventually spins out of control. The images of sexual and gender identity that underwrite Justice White's representation of the
Court's institutional identity perversely twist the thesis of the great
constitutionalist Alexander Bickel that judicial review "is at least
potentially a deviant institution in a democratic society." 72
An examination of the images underlying White's text first requires
an understanding of the legitimating role that rhetorical appeals to
the ideology of fatherhood have historically played in American constitutional discourse. In America, the law of the Constitution is the
"Law-of-the-(Founding)-Father(s).

' 73

Discussions of the judiciary's

place in the American constitutional scheme reveal a similar reliance
on "paternal metaphor": the "name" of the judge is the "Name-ofthe-Father."'74 Sixty years ago, in one of the first efforts to apply psychoanalytic categories to the analysis of legal consciousness in
America, Jerome Frank argued that the "basic... myth" of American law was the myth of the "Judge-as-Infallible-Father. 7 5 Frank
argued that this myth represents a reinscription of the childhood
76
image of the "Father-as-Infallible-Judge" :
71See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.
72 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 128 (1962).
73 Jerome Frank, Law and the Modem Mind 18 (1930).
74 See id.
75 See id. at 18-19.
76 Id.
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[M]ost men [sic] are at times the victims of the childish desire for
complete serenity and the childish fear of irreducible chance ...
[They seek to fulfill that desire through] "the rediscovery of the
father," through father-substitutes....
...The Law can easily be made 77to play an important part in the
attempted rediscovery of the father.

Frank maintains that because the law, like the father, claims for itself
the power to "infallibly determin[e] what is right and what is wrong
and [to] decid[e] who should be punished for misdeeds," it function78
ally "resembles the [childhood fantasy of the] Father-as-Judge.
This image of the judge as patriarchal power informs the doctrine
of "originalism" that has been so fiercely debated in American constitutional law throughout its history.7 9 According to this doctrine, the
Supreme Court should conform its interpretations of the text of the
Constitution either to the original intentions or understandings of the
Founding Fathers.80 If the Supreme Court is the contemporary voice
of the Constitution, its legitimacy can remain secure only if the Justices remain faithful to the call across the centuries of the men who
wrote and ratified the document.81
The existence of this powerful mythic backdrop would seem to suggest that the conceptual organization of the Court's constitutional
analysis in Hardwick would be bound to a narrative system whose
chief figure would be identified as a stolid patriarch. Remarkably,
however, in Hardwick this predominant, traditional image of the
Supreme Court as a collective Father undergoes a discursive seachange, or should I say sex-change. That is, the institutional subjectposition figured in the text of Justice White's opinion begins to evoke,
alongside the image of the "Judge-as-Father," a vision of the "Judgeas-Mother," in language whose logical entailments would lead the collective mind of the Court to uncomfortable conclusions. The figural
reversal by which the Justices assume the name of Justitia bears a
77
78

Id. at 19.
Id. at 18-19.

79 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 153-55 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 886 (1985).
80See Powell, supra note 79, at 948 (criticizing that view).
81See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary 3 (1977); Henry C. Black, Handbook
on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 20 (2d ed. 1911); Thomas M. Cooley, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the
States of the American Union 124 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927).
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startling resemblance to the "transformation into a woman"
recounted by Judge Schreber in his Memoirs. 2 Recall that an "essential feature" of the judge's paranoid fantasy was that God had called
him to redeem the world by being "transformed into a woman" and
"[impregnated] by divine rays to the end that a new race of men
might be created. ' 83 Drawing on that image, we might argue against
Jerome Frank that the dominant figural self-representation of the
Court in Hardwick is not that of a patriarchal voice, but rather that of
a maternal vessel of the Constitution. To convey the dangers that
Michael Hardwick's case poses to the Court's integrity, the Court
stages a "reversal into its opposite" as described in Freud's Instincts
and their Vicissitudes.84
Justice White mobilizes the "maternal metaphor" to generate a
constellation of ideas and images that allow him to avoid the work of
reasoned constitutional analysis and argument. Situating itself in the
place and position of a woman (or more precisely, within the cultural
codes of femininity), the Hardwick Court seeks to persuade readers of
its institutional chastity. Fidelity to the "language [and] design" of
the "Law-of-the-(Founding)-Father(s)" demands "great resistance"
to Hardwick's attempted seduction of the Court, and the "illegitimacy" to which a betrayal of that law would lead.85 Because homosexual activity bears "[n]o connection ' 86 to family, marriage, or
procreation, it cannot "qualify for recognition" 87 as a species of constitutional privacy. Because Michael Hardwick's asserted "right" to
engage in homosexual sodomy is "not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text,"'8 8 judicial invalidation of Georgia's "anti-sodomy"
law would represent an act of interpretive adultery, whose shameful
outcome can only be the birth of a "bastard" right with no legitimate
textual "roots" or claim to the "Name-of-the-(Founding)-Father(s)."
What is the meaning of this discursive transformation of the institutional image of the Supreme Court in Hardwick from a subject-posi82 See Schreber, supra note 11, at 300; supra notes 11-31 and accompanying text.

83 See Freud, supra note 12, at 20.
84 Sigmund Freud, Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915), reprintedin 14 Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 126-27 (James Strachey trans. & ed.,
1957).
85 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-95; Frank, supra note 73, at 18.
86 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
87 Id. at 195.
88 Id. at 191.
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tion of "masculine" activity to "feminine" (aggressive) passivity? The
beginnings of an answer to this question are suggested by Leo Bersani's essay, Is the Rectum a Grave?9 Bersani argues that in the
homophobic American mind, the regnant representation of the gay
male homosexual is that of "a grown man, legs high in the air, unable
to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman." 90 Drawing on the
work of John Boswell 91 and Michel Foucault, 92 Bersani contends that
this image is so terrifying to the masculinist imagination because it
conjures up the sodomitical spectacle of a man in a passive (i.e.,
female) position, a position which, at least for the patriarchal psyche
of the male heterosexual, entails a horrifying abdication of power. 3
For Bersani, the gay man's rectum is a "grave in which the masculine
ideal ...

of proud subjectivity is buried." 94 Anal eroticism among

men must therefore be repudiated (in psychoanalytic terms "sublimated") because it poses a threat to the phallic law of masculine heterosexuality. 95 It is perhaps this image of male homosexuality that
led Chief Justice E. Warren Burger in his concurring opinion to note
with apparent approval that William Blackstone described sex
between men "as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape."96 The
"deeper malignity" of "homosexual sodomy" lies in the fact that,
unlike rape, sex between men represents an assault on the normative
order of male heterosexuality-indeed, an abdication of masculine
identity as such.
In fact, however, the process of identification inscribed in the rhetorical operations of Justice White's text suggests that matters are
considerably more complex than a simple misogynist aversion to the
dangers that male homosexuality embodies for the masculinist heterosexual ideal. Hardwick shows that the radical dis-identification with
male homosexuality that Bersani takes to be basic to the fantasmatic
89 See Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43 October, Winter 1987, at 197.

90 Id. at 212.
91 John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality (1980).
92 See Foucault, supra note 9.
93 Bersani, supra note 89, at 212.
94 Id. at 222.

95 We are talking here about the meaning of the anus in the male heterosexual imagination,
for which "[male] [h]omosexuality is always connected with the anus, even though-as
Kinsey's precious statistics demonstrate-anal intercourse is still
the exception even among
homosexuals." Guy Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire 89 (Daniella Dangoor trans., 1978).
96 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *215).
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structure of male heterosexuality is less fixed and more fluid than the
terms of Is the Rectum a Grave? suggests. What makes Hardwick so
fascinating a text in the juridical archive of discursive heterosexual
identification, as well of the processes of homosexual differentiation
by which heterosexual identity is secured, is its vertiginous instability:
the opinion ricochets back and forth between masculine and feminine
polarities. The Court's rhetorical contortions in Hardwick reveal the
desperate lengths to which the paranoid judicial imagination is willing, at least figurally, to go in order to defend itself from a constitutional claim which "gnaws at the roots of [the] male heterosexual
identity" 97 that subtends the Court's institutional self-image.
In order to deny Michael Hardwick's claim of constitutional privacy, the "Father-Judges" of the Supreme Court do not hesitate to
abandon the paternal metaphor through which they have traditionally
represented the Court's role in our constitutional scheme, or the patrilineal identification from which a good measure of its cultural authority has historically derived. At the doctrinal level, the Court flatly
rejects any connection between Hardwick's asserted right to commit
homosexual sodomy and the heterosexual practices at issue in the
Supreme Court's previous elaborations of the right to privacy. And
yet, standing alone, the doctrinal disavowal of Hardwick's appeal to
the privacy principle is not enough. The Hardwick Court's doctrinal
pronouncements about the political "limits" beyond which it refuses
to go demand additional discursive reinforcement. The Court is not
content simply to reject Hardwick's "facetious" claim of a constitutional right to commit what the Chief Justice (again quoting Blackstone) calls "a heinous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named.' "98 The bonds
between the "law" of normative male heterosexuality and American
constitutional law are so close that the asserted right to commit
"homosexual sodomy" "pressed" by Michael Hardwick on the Court
provokes nothing less than a crisis of institutional representation.
This panic finds displaced expression in the wild veering of subjective
standpoint(s) from which the Court analyzes Hardwick's claim. It is
as if Justice White needs to go "both ways": only a protean subject
97 See Jeffrey Weeks, Sexuality and Its Discontents: Meanings, Myths and Modem

Sexualities 191 (1985).
98 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *215).
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position can enable the Hardwick Court to manage the contradictions
posed by its unwillingness to extend constitutional privacy jurisprudence to a case whose facts in many ways make it "the most private of
all [the] privacy cases." 99
Over and above the rule of the case, the potentially destabilizing
effects of the issue posed in Hardwick seem to require this presumptively heterosexual Court to perform a radical act of rhetorical disidentification with the very figure of the male homosexual. Faced
with a constitutional question that assaults its members' institutional
and individual identities, the Supreme Court can only imagine or fear
itself in a "vulnerable," unmanly, and perforce, enfeminized position.
If "homosexual sodomy" is "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than
rape," the Supreme Court must meet its dangers with "utmost resistance. '"" This resistance is inscribed in the rhetorical politics of the
Hardwick opinion itself.
This contention is not simply a negative claim. The language of the
Hardwick Court permits it to resist Hardwick's attempt to win constitutional recognition of a right to engage in "homosexual sodomy," a
refusal which flies in the face of the Court's earlier privacy decisions.
But that is not all. In a sense, the Court's enfeminized posture of
"weakness" also gives it a certain strength. The maternal metaphor
to which Justice White resorts allows him to reject Hardwick's attack
99 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1437 (1992).
100 This phrase refers to the old legal doctrine that a woman who accused a man of rape
must be able to show that she responded to the threat of sexual assault with "utmost
resistance." A description of the arguably more "relaxed" contemporary standard may be
found in the dissenting opinion of Judge Cole in State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 728-35 (Md.
1981) (Cole, J., dissenting). TheRusk Court upheld a rape conviction which a lower appellate
court reversed on the grounds that the conviction had been secured on legally insufficient
evidence. Id. at 728. Judge Cole protested, arguing:
While courts no longer require a female to resist to the utmost or to resist where
resistance would be foolhardy, they do require her acquiescence in the act of intercourse
to stem from fear generated by something of substance. She may not simply say, "I was
really scared," and thereby transform consent or mere unwillingness into submission by
force. These words do not transform a seducer into a rapist. She must follow the
natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere words, the violation
of her person by a stranger or an unwelcomed friend. She must make it plain that she
regards such sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural sense of pride. She
must resist unless the defendant has objectively manifested his intent to use physical
force to accomplish his purpose. The law regards rape as a crime of violence.
Id. at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting). For a critical discussion of the "resistance" standard in rape
law, see Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 680, 684 (1966).
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on the Georgia "anti-sodomy" statute from a point of symbolic identification which figurally protects the Court from the dangers that simply mentioning sexual pleasure between men poses to the patriarchal
law. If "homosexual sodomy" is a "crime not fit to be named," not
even the "Father-Judges" of the Supreme Court can break that linguistic taboo without first submitting to a discursive "sex-change" or
"unmanning" which removes them, like Judge Schreber, from "the
category of men" on whom the male homosexual preys.
Nonetheless, the displaced sexual field in which the Hardwick
Court rhetorically reinscribes the rule of privacy in order to justify
this outcome entails its own unavoidable and uncontrollable risks.
How is this claim to be understood? As I have noted, the Court
achieves its defensive dis-identification from Michael Hardwick in the
text by transversing the gender line. The Justices assume a kind of
feminine position in relation to the Founding Fathers, or rather to the
Constitution, that potent symbolic incubus that our national
patriarchs left behind, and from which our contemporary constitutional order derives its legitimacy. Yet, the Hardwick Court's imaginary cross-identification across the gender divide unwittingly
compounds the psycho-social difficulties raised by the case. The
resistance to Hardwick that the Court's figural and phantasmagoric
transsexualization into a woman makes possible cannot, by the nature
of the case, fully secure its intended ratification of the masculinist heterosexual ideal. Like all acts of sexual identification, the Supreme
Court's attempt to bind its institutional consciousness to the image
and ideology of patriarchal male heterosexuality fails fully or finally
to succeed.
The terms of Bersani's argument may help explain why the slippage
of sexual identities staged in Hardwick is as perilous as it is productive. If Bersani is correct about the workings of the homophobic
imagination, the Hardwick Court's attempted stabilization of male
heterosexual identity is doomed from its inception by the form of the
figural logic by which it is governed. The inaugural gesture of gender
cross-identification always already incorporates the very (passive)
position by which the male homosexual body is fantasmatically, and
in this case, phobically, conceived. The Hardwick Court's
homophobic dis-identification with the aggressive male homosexual
body of Michael Hardwick forces a now enfeminized legal consciousness to identify with the regnant representation of the dangerous fig-
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ure whose constitutional rights the decision's doctrinal contortions
take such pains to deny. Homophobic dis-identification paradoxically
results in homosexual "identification with the aggressor."
Moreover, the Court's construction of its identity in the text of the
Hardwick decision provides an evidentiary instance of Freud's claim
that "all human beings are capable of making a homosexual objectchoice and have in fact made one in their unconscious."' 10 1 If "the
maintenance of heterosexual identity is dependent upon active avoidance of that psychic reality,"' 1 2 the strategy of gendered identification
pursued in the text of the Hardwick decision represents a massive failure. The Hardwick Court cannot escape the reality that the law of
heterosexuality finds its normative foothold in the very figure it views
with such contempt. In the gendered "switch" from paternal to
maternal metaphor, the homophobic discourse of Hardwick provides
a dysphoric point of (re)entry for its (homosexual) repressed.
Recall the earlier passage of the Hardwick decision in which Justice
White ritually invokes the standard distinction between the "wisdom"
and the "constitutionality" of the challenged statute.10 He insists
that in Hardwick, the Court is concerned only with the "validity" and
not the "desirability" of laws such as the Georgia statute.' 4 The
Court's task in Hardwick, according to White, is dispassionately to
render a decision according to law, not to intervene in the passionate
polemics of politics. 05 Consider once more the discursive disclaimer
with which the Hardwick opinion begins:
This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in
particular, are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right
or propriety of state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that
criminalize homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional grounds. The issue presented is
whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of
101Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), in 7 Standard Edition
of the Collected Works of Sigmund Freud 144 n.1 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1958).
102 Tim Dean, The Psychoanalysis of AIDS, 63 October, Winter 1993, at 83, 112.
103 478 U.S. at 190.
104
105

Id.
Id.
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the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so
6
for a very long time. 1
Behind Justice White's language stands a conception of constitutional
adjudication whose resemblance to the position taken by the
psychotic Judge Schreber should not go unremarked.
Freud notes that in the Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, Schreber
insists that it is not the judge, but the "Order of Things" that
demands his "emasculation":
It is not to be supposed that he wishes to be transformed into a
woman; it is rather a question of a "must" based upon the Order of
Things, which there is no possibility of his evading, much as he would

personally prefer
to remain in his own honourable and masculine sta10 7
tion in life.

Similarly, Justice White implies that judicial allegiance to the principles of American constitutionalism demands a similar submission by
the Supreme Court to the will of the state of Georgia. For Justice
White, what is at stake here is the constitutional validity of the laws
against "homosexual sodomy," not their desirability.10 8 As to this
latter question, the constitutional "Order of Things" requires the
members of the Supreme Court to adopt an institutional posture of
official indifference. Respect for the limited role of the Supreme
Court in our constitutional system obliges the Justices to keep their
personal preferences regarding the wisdom of the law challenged in
Hardwick to themselves.
A careful reading of the text, however, demonstrates that the language of the Hardwick opinion in fact undermines, and ultimately
overtakes, the Court's putatively detached and disinterested logic.
The figural "unconscious" of the text demonstrates that because of
political commitments that he either cannot or will not acknowledge,
Justice White is finally unable to avoid the dark domain of desire
whither a serious judicial inquiry into the legal imposition of compulsory heterosexuality would lead the Court.10 9 In Hardwick, the voice
106 Id.
107 Freud, supra note 12, at 17.
108 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190.

109 Obviously, I mean to evoke the expansive understanding of "desire" developed in the
Freudian theory of the libido, for which the term refers to the full continuum of human
emotions ranging from love to hatred. See Sigmund Freud, The Libido Theory, reprintedin 5
Collected Papers (Joan Riviere trans., 1959).

1828

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 79:1805

of desire is "imbedded" in the "very delirium of metonymy" 0 by
which the "Court" (itself a metonymic figure) anxiously articulates its
"vulnerability" and mobilizes its powers of "resistance" to the claim
"pressed" by Michael Hardwick. By the end of the Hardwick opinion, the text has confessed with equal insistence the very interest in
homosexuality that Justice White has so insistently disavowed: the
rhetoric of Hardwick is shot through with the traces of the
homophobic passion whose relevance the Court's decision has taken
such great pain to deny. That passion eclipses the cool, constitutional
reason by which the Supreme Court claims to be bound and belies
Justice White's contention that the Hardwick decision has nothing to
do with the "imposition of the Justices' own choice of values"1'11
regarding the legal regulation of gay and lesbian sexuality.
I hope by now to have shown that the Hardwick Court is not simply adjudicating the constitutionality of a statutorily codified
homophobia (the Georgia "anti-sodomy" law) which is anterior to, or
independent of, its own analysis. To the contrary, in Hardwick, the
Supreme Court does not calmly reason about homosexuality, but
rather rages irrationally against it. The rhetoric of the Hardwick
decision discursively makes and marks the sexual difference between
heterosexuality and homosexuality that makes homophobia possible.
As a textual representation and ratification of normative heterosexuality, the Court's decision in Hardwick does not merely reflect the constitutional legitimacy of the politics of homophobia but, more
importantly, is itself an instance of the paranoid juridical forms that
politics sometimes takes.
Hardwick's lawyers modestly argued that the private, consensual
sexual practices for which he was arrested were not different in any
relevant aspect from those to which the Supreme Court had accorded
constitutional protection in its earlier privacy decisions.1 12 The doctrinal step the Supreme Court was asked to take in Hardwick was
thus quite conservative. Justice White responds to this assertion of
legal identity between Hardwick and cases such as Griswold v. Con-

110 Fredric Jameson, Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, The Modernist as Fascist 27

(1979).
11 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
112 Id. at 188-89.
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necticut 113 and Roe v. Wade1 1 4 by erecting a rhetorical wall of sexual
difference between "family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand
and homosexual activity on the other":115 "[W]e think it evident that
none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to
the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
'
sodomy that is asserted in this case." 116
This discourse of sexual difference enables the Hardwick Court to
sustain its doctrinal refusal to extend the protections of constitutional
privacy to gay men and lesbians. A rhetorical reading of the text of
Hardwick suggests that the sexual difference between heterosexuality
and homosexuality stressed by Justice White is not a cause, but rather
an effect of the decision. This metalepsis-which is reflected in the
tropological switch from paternal to maternal metaphor-produces a
destabilizing effect on the very notion of heterosexual identity, without which the idea of homosexual difference makes no sense. This
destabilization (or should I say devaluation) of heterosexual identity
is the cost of the sexuated (ex)change in subject positions by which the
Supreme Court distances itself rhetorically from Michael Hardwick
and his constitutional claim.
The reading presented here of textually constructed sexual difference in Hardwick has serious implications for contemporary critiques
of identity politics in gay and lesbian theory. This rhetorical reading
of the (hetero)sexuated figural logic of Hardwick illustrates the need
for a more precise understanding of ideologies of sexual difference
than the emerging critique of gay and lesbian identity politics in
American legal scholarship has thus far offered. Writing from this
critical perspective, one commentator on the case has argued that the
assertion of homosexual identity in Hardwick was "simply the flip
side of the same rigidification of sexual identities by which our society
simultaneously inculcates sexual roles, normalizes sexual conduct,
and vilifies 'faggots' 117 and straightjackets "those who engage in
homosexual sex into a fixed identity specified by their difference from
'heterosexuals.' "11 This argument holds that Hardwick shows the
U.S. 479 (1965).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
I'5Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
116 Id. at 190-91.
113 381
114

117

Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 781 (1989).

118 Id. at 779 (emphasis added).
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dangers of too insistent an emphasis on the "homosexuality" of the
sexual practices that were prohibited by the Georgia "anti-sodomy"
law upheld by the Supreme Court. According to this account, when
Michael Hardwick's lawyers decided to describe their client as a
"practicing homosexual" in the complaint filed on his behalf, they
unwittingly undermined the force of Hardwick's essentially identitybased claim-that his interests in sexual privacy were constitutionally
indistinguishable from those of heterosexuals.
This critique of a rights discourse based on the assertion of homosexual identity misses the mark. By identifying the Hardwick Court's
"obsessive focus" '"1 9 on homosexual difference-on the "particularly
homosexual aspect of homosexual sex"12P--as a critical feature of its
decision, this view blames the idea of gay and lesbian identity itself for
the case's outcome. Essentially, it proposes that the inclusionary
claims of identity politics are ultimately indistinguishable from those
made on behalf of an exclusionary politics-a proposition that can be
sustained only if one fails to take into account the different power
positions from which, as well as the purposes for which, these appeals
to sexual identity have been made.
The emerging legal critique of the assertion of difference in gay and
lesbian identity politics ignores a crucial distinction between two very
different types of claims, a distinction we overlook at our peril. One
could understand the assertion of homosexual difference to be an
ontological claim that the physical difference between homosexual
and heterosexual acts produces a difference in sexual identity. This
categorical claim is untenable. As I have argued elsewhere,121 however, one could rest the argument for homosexual difference and its
assertion on a very different ground. This argument starts from the
proposition that there is an undeniable historical difference between
the societal treatment and consequences of homosexual acts, a particularity which has forged a distinct social place and position for those
with whom same-sex practice is identified. As an historical matter,
the proclamation of homosexual identity does not, and need not,
appeal to "some common characterological essence that sets those
who embrace that identity apart from those who do not; rather, this
119 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120 Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 778-79.
121 Thomas, supra note 99, at 1501, 1502 n.249.
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assertion of homosexual identity derives from a common historical
experience of [domination]."' 122 This position does not contend that
the "homosexual" is a "personage," or "a type of life, a life form, and
a morphology"; 123 it does insist that the idea of a homosexual identity
be understood as an historically "entrenched contingency."' 124 This
latter description of homosexual identity, and the pursuit of a politics
based on that identity, does not revolve around an essentialist claim
that homosexuals are different but around an historical claim that
they have been treated differently. Viewed in this light, the politics of
gay and lesbian identity might be considered as a practice whose best
and most basic commitments emerge in historical moments of critical
calculation regarding our collective situation, not from a timeless metaphysical faith in our collective sensibility. Gay and lesbian politics
' 25
may thus be understood as a "politics of location."'
The phobic figural representations by which the Supreme Court
produces a hierarchical differentiation or "scaling" 126 of homosexual
and heterosexual acts and agency in the Hardwick decision provide an
indispensable map of the ideological situation with which contemporary gay and lesbian politics must now contend. The rhetorical politics of the Hardwick opinion suggests that we are indeed in
treacherous terrain. Hardwick offers textual proof from law of the
social constructionist claim that the idea of a distinct "homosexual"
identity (or for that matter of a distinct "heterosexual" one) is a discursively constructed ideological category, and thus false. The ideological character of the "homosexual" identity fabricated in Hardwick
resides in its constitutive "confusion of linguistic with natural reality.' 27 The Court uses this confusion to erect a thoroughly imaginary figure of the (male) "homosexual," in "willful blindness"1 2 8 to
the fact that both this figure and the act of "homosexual sodomy" of
which Hardwick was accused rest on equally imaginary epistemological grounds.
122 Id.

123Foucault, supra note 9, at 43.
124William E. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political
Paradox 176 (1991).
125Adrienne Rich, Notes toward a Politics of Location (1984), in Blood, Bread and Poetry:
Selected Prose 1979-1985, at 210 (1986).
1261 take this term from Iris M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 122 (1990).
127 See Paul de Man, The Resistance to Theory 11 (1986).

128 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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This insight into the figural, and therefore fictive, foundations of
"homosexual" and "heterosexual" identities is important because it
allows us to expose and attack the "regime of truth" on which the
Hardwick opinion stands. Because the Hardwick Court's rhetorical
representations carry the force of law, however, the "homosexual"
and "heterosexual" identities the Supreme Court constructed in its
decision cannot be dismissed false-they are real. Stated bluntly, we
ought not forget that conviction under the statute Michael Hardwick
was charged with violating could be punished by imprisonment for up
to twenty years. 129 Nor should we ignore the fact that the Hardwick
case took place against a backdrop of a long history of violence
against "homosexuals" whose bloody consequences have been all too
real. 130 The lesson I take from my reading of Hardwick is this: in the
law, the rhetorical politics of "homosexual" and "heterosexual" identities matter. To be sure, we must remain mindful of difficulties that
attend the very notion of sexual identity. At the same time, however,
we must recognize that the strategic negotiation of those difficulties is
a challenge that we cannot simply refuse. In Hardwick, the Supreme
Court taught us that the assertion of sexual difference, and an oppositional politics that engages that difference, are practices that gay and
lesbian Americans finally cannot do without.

Id. at 188 n.1; Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1984).
For a discussion of the structures of homophobic violence to which Hardwick in
particular, and "anti-sodomy" statutes in general lend ideological legitimacy, see Thomas,
supra note 99, at 1467-92.
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